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The quest for an appropriate development and transition strategy in less developed 
countries (LDCs) and post-socialist countries (PSCs) has been studied for a long 
time, and it has been subject to numerous controversies among academics and 
development practitioners alike. Disputes have existed with respect to sequencing, 
timing, and pacing reforms, regarding the components of stabilization-cum-
adjustment programs, and also relating to the question which actors can become 
effective drivers of transition and development. Today, a widespread consensus 
exists that institutions and governance matter for making market-oriented policy 
reform succeed and that governments, despite the general need for less state 
interventionism, remain central actors for institution building and rule enforcement. 
The following considerations focus on the question whether or not the concept of the 
Social Market Economy, as it was originally developed and designed by German 
academics and policymakers more than fifty years ago, will be appropriate to guide 
policy and institutional reform in LDCs and PSCs and to make market-oriented 
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The quest for an appropriate development and transition strategy in less developed 
countries (LDCs) and post-socialist countries (PSCs) has been studied for a long 
time, and it has been subject to numerous controversies among academics and 
development practitioners alike. Disputes have existed with respect to sequencing, 
timing, and pacing reforms, regarding the components of stabilization-cum-
adjustment programs, and also relating to the question which actors can become 
effective drivers of transition and development. Today, a widespread consensus 
exists that institutions and governance matter for making market-oriented policy 
reform succeed and that governments, despite the general need for less state 
interventionism, remain central actors for institution building and rule enforcement. 
The search for a suitable strategy has been aggravated because a general 
theory of development and transition does not exist. Several historical role models, 
however, can be identified which may provide general guidance for policymakers. 
Besides the model of a liberal market economy, as it has been applied, e.g., in the 
United States, other market-based models can be identified such as the 
Scandinavian model of the welfare state or the German model of a Social Market 
Economy. The latter could be of particular relevance for LDCs and PSCs because it 
appears to combine the advantages of a liberal market economy in terms of 
economic efficiency with the advantages of a welfare state in terms of social justice. 
The following considerations focus on the question whether or not the concept of 
the Social Market Economy, as it was originally developed and designed by German 
academics and policymakers more than fifty years ago, will be appropriate to guide 
policy and institutional reform in LDCs and PSCs and to make market-oriented 
reforms a viable policy choice in such countries regardless of their political regime. 
It will be argued that whether or not the transition towards a market economy is 
successful, i.e. whether it leads to large-scale efficiency gains and sustained 
economic growth-cum-change, ultimately depends on the implementation of the new   3
rules of the game and their impartial, transparent, and predictable enforcement and, 
related to that, the societal acceptability and hence political feasibility of the 
envisaged economic reform and transformation steps. This implies that the concept 
of a Social Market Economy can be applied in diverse environments, but that the 
institutional characteristics of the Social Market Economy will be contingent on the 
stage of socio-economic development, existing political constraints as well as the 
historical development trajectory of the respective country. 
The paper is organized as follows: The next chapter introduces the original ideas 
and characteristics of the Social Market Economy as it had been conceived by its 
founding fathers. Chapter 3 discusses the applicability of the concept to LDCs and 
PSCs. It is argued that a gradual and non-orthodox implementation strategy will be 
superior to a big-bang approach and that governments need to assume new 
responsibilities, and therefore must develop novel capabilities and stronger 
capacities. Furthermore, the notion of best-practice institutions is being rejected. 
Instead, it is argued that economic governance is a dynamic process during which 
transitional institutions may prove to be economically efficient and politically feasible 
in certain periods of time. In the course of socio-economic development, these 
institutions may become inappropriate due to changing political, economic, social, 
and international constraints, and hence they will be replaced by other transitional 
institutions. This suggests that pragmatic flexibility and policy adaptability are key 
characteristics of successful policymaking. Institutional frameworks which allow for 




2.  The idea of the Social Market Economy 
 
By its founding fathers, the Social Market Economy was conceived as a liberal 
market economy, based on ordoliberal reasoning, which was social by itself. The 
original conception of the Social Market Economy was developed in Germany before 
and during World War II as a potential post-war economic order. After the war, it was 
politically and visibly represented by Ludwig Erhard, among others. The concept did 
not allow for the substitution or elimination of market processes through state 
interventions or the active correction of market outcomes. The idea implied the   4
realization of a market order based on individual self-responsibility with no or only 
very limited government redistribution. An indicator of the success of the Social 
Market Economy was said to be the fact that public social transfer payments became 
redundant due to continuously improving economic performance and all economic 
actors’ participation therein (Wünsche 1994: 36). Thus, the original Social Market 
Economy does not develop its social characteristics through artificially imposing 
apparently social elements (favoring particular groups in society) onto an otherwise 
free market system. Rather, the attribute social is to be justified through the functions 
of economic competition and technological progress leading to economic growth 
processes, which allow a socially just distribution of income increases. 
This is what Müller-Armack (1956: 390), who coined the term Social Market 
Economy, may have had in mind. He defined the concept as “an idea of order policy 
(..) pursuing the objective, on the basis of a competitive market economy, to link free 
initiative with social progress which is being assured exactly through market 
economic performance”
1 According to Ludwig Erhard, this, in fact, was supposed to 
be the driving force to unfold and ensure individual freedom. However, the basic 
principles underlying the concept of the Social Market Economy do not only include 
individual freedom and functioning competition. Subsidiarity, solidarity, and 
responsibility complete the set of basic principles. In order to ensure an efficient 
functioning of the economic order, to maintain social peace, and to enhance the 
societal acceptance of this particular capitalist system, solidarity mechanisms need to 
be in place which support the disadvantaged who cannot sufficiently participate in 
market processes and earn a living or who are handicapped in another way. 
Basically, citizens are supposed to be self-responsible. Hence, in order to make 
incentives compatible, any public support should be organized in a subsidiary way 
(Schlecht 2001). 
Körner (2007: 19) argues, that, besides the principle of individual freedom, the 
commandment of social justice equally serves as a foundation of the economic and 
societal order. This would, however, not allow a onesided interpretation favoring 
either radical market liberalism or an encompassing, egalitarian social-policy 
approach. Both principles together constitute a framework for developing and 
securing a humane economic and social order. Eventually, this concept may help to 
                                                 
1   Author’s translation; the original reads “eine ordnungstheoretische Idee (..), deren Ziel es ist, 
auf der Basis der Wettbewerbswirtschaft die freie Initiative mit einem gerade durch die 
marktwirtschaftliche Leistung gesicherten sozialen Fortschritt zu verbinden.“   5
bundle vested interests, to amalgamate diverse ideologies, and to harmonize 
different moral concepts. 
In order to protect the Social Market Economy, a concentration of economic 
power has to be avoided. Neither the economic order nor economic policies should 
be subject to the influence of powerful interest groups or business cartels. Therefore, 
Eucken (1990/1952) postulated that politics and public policies ought to dissolve 
powerful economic groups or, at least, limit their functions. Moreover, public 
policymaking should focus on crafting and impartially enforcing the economic order 
and should not seek to steer economic processes. 
Time and again, the attribute social has been the cause for conflicting political 
disputes. On the one hand, this attribute helped to gain societal acceptance for 
implementing the new economic order. On the other hand, the meaning of social 
remained unclear or was subject to opportunistic (political) interpretations. In the 
course of post World War II German economic history, the Social Market Economy 
has undergone a remarkable evolution with substantial reforms, additions, and 
modifications. These include, e.g., the introduction of a pay-as-you-go pension 
system, comprehensive worker co-determination rights, substantial social protection, 
and a generous social transfer system. As a consequence, an affluent welfare state 
has emerged the financing of which is getting ever more difficult, the incentives of 
which counteract market principles, and the survival of which is being challenged by 
globalization forces, demographic trends, and politically opportunistic behavior. The 
remainder of this paper does not explicitly focus on the actual design and evolution of 
the Social Market Economy in contemporary Germany.
2 Instead, Müller-Armack’s 
definition serves as a point of departure and reference for addressing the question 
whether or not the concept of the Social Market Economy can be usefully applied to 
transition countries. 
 
                                                 
2   With respect to this aspect and regarding the need for Germany to re-model its approach to a 
Social Market Economy in order to address the challenges from globalization and European 
integration, see, e.g., Vanberg (2007), Streit (2005), and Hass (2007).   6
Figure 1: Principles of the Market-Economic Order 
- private property rights
- monetary stability
- flexible prices on competitive 
markets
- freedom of contract
- competency and liability
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PRINCIPLES OF THE MARKET-ECONOMIC ORDER
(according to Eucken)
- anti-trust policy
- public redistribution policy (with 
an incentive-compatible tax 
system)
- social security/safe working 
conditions
- compensation of market failure
 
   Source:  Eucken  (1990/1952);  author 
 
A market economy is an order which ensures the autonomy of economic actors and 
coordinates  − through the system of flexible relative prices − economic activities 
which take place within a given market-oriented institutional framework.
3 The basic 
understanding underlying the concept of the Social Market Economy is that a society 
consists of different orders, the political, economic, and social orders, and that each 
of these consists of various sub-orders, e.g., the monetary order and the legal order. 
Each order is made up of institutions, conceived as formal and informal rules of the 
game including their enforcement characteristics. These economic, political, and 
social institutions provide the incentive structure within a society and determine the 
behavior and actions of individuals. The main task of the government is to establish 
and enforce this order whithout intervening into economic processes. Thus institution 
building, or more generally order policy, is the key to bring about a functioning, 
efficient, and politically feasible market system. Order policy concerns the entirety of 
rules, which are relevant for the organizational structure of an economy and for 
economic processes as well as the entirety of mechanisms which are responsible for 
administering and steering the economy. 
Today, it is widely recognized that macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, and 
price liberalization, though necessary components of economic transition and policy 
                                                 
3   A large part of the following considerations heavily draw from Ahrens (2002a).   7
reform, are insufficient and that adequate economic rules and regulations must be in 
place to make incentives work and markets perform well, to reduce transaction 
uncertainties between private actors, and hence to support private sector 
development and coordination. In the 1990s, three disparate developments helped 
reinforce the efforts to put institutions on the reform agenda of policymakers. The first 
one was the failure of price liberalization and privatization in the Russian Federation 
and other successor states of the USSR due to a lack of a market-oriented 
regulatory, legal, and political framework. Another one was the dissatisfaction with 
economic reforms in Latin American countries and the insight that these policy 
reforms neglected the importance of safety nets and social insurance. The third one 
was the Asian crisis in 1997/98 which revealed that financial liberalization without 
prudent regulation can have disastrous consequences (Rodrik 1999). 
The constituent principles of a Social Market Economy elaborated by the German 
ordo liberal school and, in particular, by Walter Eucken (1990/1952) serve as a useful 
starting point for identifying key economic institutions which matter for market 
performance and the evolution of a private sector. Ordo liberals derive their 
prescriptions for public policymaking from the notion of order which is a fundamental 
precondition to make governance structures effective. 
Order means that repetitive events or actions fit into a discernible pattern which allows people to 
have confidence that the pattern of future actions, on which they may depend, can be predicted 
reasonably well. If the world is ordered, complexity, and hence the knowledge problem, is reduced 
and economic agents are better able to specialise. Institutions serve to facilitate the emergence of 
order.
4 
Adherents to the ordo liberal school favor order policy (i.e., supporting and enhancing 
the economic and social order of society) over process intervention. This maxim is 
essentially based on three axioms including that (1) cognitive abilities of individuals 
are limited so that an order, that allows recognizable patterns to be uncovered, will 
improve living standards through an enhanced division of labor and give citizens 
distinctive realms of freedom; (2) individual freedom is an unalterable prerequisite of 
competition; and (3) order is required to make binding commitments possible and to 
enforce formal rules in order to overcome problems of asymmetric information and 
the temptations of opportunistic behavior (Kasper and Streit 1998). 
Public policymaking that is based on the commitment to consistently conduct order 
policy will not only ensure that individual freedoms are more secure but that 
                                                 
4.  Kasper and Streit (1998: 151; emphasis omitted).   8
economic coordination is more effective and rent-seeking and discrimination are 
limited. Arbitrary ad hoc interventions and conscious discretionary policymaking (e.g., 
to smooth cyclical economic swings with respect to aggregate demand), it is argued, 
will attenuate market signals, create economic disturbances and destabilize private 
actors’ expectations (Eucken 1990/1952). Government interventions into economic 
processes should be only undertaken if they are market compatible, i.e. if they “do 
not interfere with the price mechanism and with the automatism of the market derived 
from it” (Röpke 1950: 160). 
The primary focus of ordo liberals is on competition, because competitive 
structures display basic control and knowledge-generating functions that serve to 
efficiently operate a complex market system. This implies that all policy measures 
ought to be market conforming. By the same token, redistribution policies should be 
rejected unless they aimed at ensuring the opportunity of equality for individuals and 
firms in a way which would not erode competitive signals. Thus, universal institutional 
arrangements which equally apply to all economic actors are more desirable than 
discriminatory interventions and specific directives (Kasper and Streit 1998). 
The constituent principles of order policy that promise to enhance and maintain 
competitive markets include a flexible system of market prices, monetary stability, 
private property rights, open markets (i.e., freedom of both entry as well as exit), the 
liability of all economic actors for their actions and commitments, freedom of contract, 
and the steadiness of economic policymaking (see Figure 1). Since the proper 
functioning of a competitive order is based on the decentralized ex post coordination 
of individual plans and actions through market transactions, establishing a system of 
flexible market prices will be the focal point of creating and maintaining a market 
economy. Only a price system that reflects the scarcities of goods, services, and the 
factors of production can efficiently fulfill the functions of a competitive system. This is 
why Eucken postulates a primacy of monetary stability. But basically all constituent 
principles are interdependent. Therefore, ordo liberals argue that they need to be 
realized simultaneously in order to effectively promote private sector development 
and to establish a functioning market economy. In addition, these principles need to 
be complemented by so-called regulating principles, because actual market-oriented 
economies may contain weaknesses and deficits which require correction. Eucken 
thus emphasizes the need for anti-trust policies in order to prevent the emergence of 
monopolistic power, the need to correct income distribution (e.g., though a   9
progressive income tax) in order to enhance social justice, the need for social safety 





3.  A Social Market Economy for transition countries? 
 
As regards its justification, the idea of the Social Market Economy rests on ethical 
norms such as solidarity and social protection in order to generate social peace and 
hence a secure societal foundation of sustained economic growth and development. 
Moreover, one may argue that social aspects in economic lifes and economic 
policymaking help to ensure the political feasibility of economic reforms in times of 
major policy and institutional reforms and particulary in times of systemic 
transformation in which (potential) losers from economic restucturing and institutional 
change may threaten to object or even block reforms. Finding a social balance or 
compensation for individual losses may help to enhance the acceptance of 
policymaking, the credibility and hence the legitimacy of policymakers. 
  Taking this as a point of departure, the following discussion seeks to develop 
arguments on how to introduce and secure the concept of the Social Market 
Economy in times of economic transition from a state-led towards a market based 
system. It will be argued that blueprints or best-practice approaches are not 
available, that the transition will be time-consuming, and that country-specific 
transitional institutions may become crucial determinants of success. 
 
 
3.1  An argument in favor of a non-orthodox, gradual approach 
 
However important the constituent and regulatory principles may be for the proper 
functioning of market economies, the ordo liberal school shows two basic 
weaknesses, especially if the concept of the Social Market Economy is to be applied 
                                                 
5.  See Eucken (1990/1952). Notice in this connection that our references to ordo liberal ideas are 
restricted to the policy prescriptions concerning the economic order. Actually, the ordo liberal 
approach is much broader in that it not only emphasizes the interrelations of institutional 
frameworks of various product and factor markets but also the interdependence of all sub-orders 
of society comprising the economic, the political and the social order. This implies that economic, 
social, legal, and other policies need to be compatible so that the institutions of different sub-
orders mutually support each other; see, e.g., Böhm (1950) and Leipold (1994).   10
in the context of systemic transition. On the one hand, this school of thought has not 
answered the question of how to acquire those institutions which are required to fulfill 
these principles and how policymakers can credibly commit themselves to conduct 
order policy instead of relying on interventionist measures which may serve narrow 
interests. On the other hand, the ordo liberals have somewhat neglected the dynamic 
aspects of a growing developing or transition country, the economy of which may be 
subject to widespread market and coordination failures. 
Regarding the second qualifier, it is to be noted that markets not only fail due to 
anti-competitive behavior but also due to relatively high transaction costs preventing 
privately induced technological change and due to adverse selection and moral 
hazard resulting from incomplete information. More modern economic theories 
including those of imperfect competition and principle-agents relations have 
recognized these failures and developed regulatory instruments to cope with them. In 
reality, all successful market economies rely on a set of regulatory organizations and 
institutions which oversee product and factor markets. With respect to less developed 
countries (LDCs) and also previously socialists countries (PSCs), where market 
failures are more pervasive than in industrialized countries, it is essential to 
understand that regulation may go beyond issues such as securities regulation, 
financial supervision, and anti-trust. Rodrik (1995 and 1999), Hellmann et al. (1997), 
and Lau (1997), among others, convincingly argue that especially coordination 
failures and imperfect capital markets require strategic government interventions in 
order to trigger socially desirable private investment. By referring to the experiences 
in East Asia and notably in Taiwan and South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s, they 
show that governments effectively coordinated private investment decisions, provided 
targeted subsidization and thus helped initiate a process of sustained growth. 
However, while institutional arrangements such as financial restraint, staggered entry 
procedures regulating market access, and the provision of contingent rents worked 
well in these countries, similar arrangements failed in others.
6 This fact does not call 
into question the usefulness of specific policy interventions per se, but indicates the 
need to better understand the institutional, economic, and political factors which 
determine the effectiveness of government interventions in a given country setting.
7 
                                                 
6.  With respect to the use of the mentioned policy instruments and institutions and the role of 
governments in East Asia in overcoming coordination failures, see Section VI.2 in Ahrens (2002a). 
7.  To foster this understanding, case studies are required which help explain the success and failure 
of various types of government intervention. With respect to selective government policies in East 
Asia, see, e.g., Ahrens (2002a).   11
Moreover, with respect to industrial policy and more specifically technology policy, 
which may be of particular importance for catching-up economies, analysts argued 
that less developed or transition countries do not simply select and costlessly apply 
technological innovations which had been introduced in more advanced industrial 
countries and which are regarded as appropriate for domestic use. Certainly, 
relatively backward economies can, as Gershenkron (1962) observed, take 
advantage of the technological knowledge of advanced countries. But they can only 
do so if they have acquired sufficient technological capabilities and institutional 
capacities to identify suitable technologies and to adapt, absorb, and improve the 
technologies imported from abroad. Since such a competence has numerous 
externalities, government activism in facilitating and encouraging the process of 
technological change is critical. Moreover, circumstantial sensitivity and tacitness in 
applying technologies make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for PSCs and 
LDCs to rely on a best-practice approach or to formulate a blueprint for national 
technological policies and their implementation. To a large extent, technological 
progress and economic performance depend on the organizational and institutional 
environment in which the industrial sector operates. Besides the macroeconomic 
policy framework, a country’s technological infrastructure is of critical importance, i.e. 
its education system, private and public research organizations, the network of 
technological and scientific associations, and its legal institutions such as intellectual 
property rights as well as contract laws which provide incentives to develop and 
exchange technologies. The technological infrastructure backs up technological 
efforts of private firms by providing standards, information, scientific knowledge, and 
facilities which cannot be established and operated by individual firms.
8 Following this 
line of reasoning, unconventional though modern approaches identify a strong need 
for public policies including selective interventions to facilitate, encourage, protect, 
and induce technological activities in LDCs as well as in transition economies (Lall 
1992 and 1997; Pack and Westphal 1986; Ahrens 2002b). 
These observations suggest that socially beneficial economic institutions may vary 
across countries and even over time within a given country. The last point becomes 
clear if one looks, e.g., at South Korea in the 1990s when close institutional 
relationships between the chaebols and the government, which had a positive overall 
                                                 
8.  See Ergas (1987), Lall (1992), and Evenson and Westphal (1995).   12
impact on the economy at earlier stages of development, increasingly became 
dysfunctional.
9 
Most of the institutional ingredients to a functioning market economy proposed by 
the German ordo liberals have not been rejected by modern economists but 
essentially taken for granted. As argued earlier, however, these institutions do not 
evolve automatically. This fact calls attention to the first qualifier mentioned above: 
how can these institutions be acquired? This question, in fact, needs to be addressed 
from two perspectives. First of all, it relates to the political institutions of a country’s 
governance structure and how these deal with problems of implementing and 
enforcing new economic institutions. In most cases, the politico-institutional 
component of a country’s governance structure has been a major determinant for the 
success or failure of policy or institutional reform. The more the political and 
administrative institutions are suitable to realize the fundamental principles that 
constitute effective governance, the easier is the acquisition, implementation, and 
enforcement of market-enhancing economic institutions. Secondly, the above 
question relates to the problem of strategy choice. What is the most conducive way to 
establish a distinct set of formal economic institutions? This question, in turn, is 
similar to the discussion about big-bang approaches versus gradualism in overall 
policy reform. Basically, two strategies to institution building can be distinguished; the 
first favoring the adoption of an institutional blueprint from advanced industrial 
economies, the second emphasizing the need to develop economic institutions 
locally by using indigenous experiences, experimentation, and local knowledge. 
While the first strategy suggests advantage be taken of the experiences of successful 
economies through importing their entire formal institutional framework at one stroke, 
the second strategy is by nature more gradual and hence time consuming. 
At first glance, the big-bang approach to institution building is distinguished by its 
procedural clarity, conceptual simplicity, and straight-forwardness. It represents an 
attractive option to policy designers because it seems to offer a useful ‘how-to 
manual’ that can be as easily articulated as the policy prescriptions inherent in the 
Washington Consensus. This approach appears to be particularly feasible if the 
development objectives of a given country are clear-cut and sufficiently realistic to be 
achieved within a certain period of time. This was, e.g., the case with respect to the 
former German Democratic Republic (GDR) that, in the course of unification with the 
                                                 
9.  With respect to the South Korean case, see the more detailed discussion in Ahrens (2002a).   13
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), ‘simply’ adopted the whole institutional 
framework of the latter.
10 Also, the substantial progress in transition in Poland 
compared to other less successful PSCs may be (at least partly) attributed to the fact 
that both the Polish post-socialist governments and broad segments of society have 
had clearly defined objectives of transition, i.e., that Poland should become a full 
member of the European Union (EU) as fast as possible. However, most LDCs and 
PSCs cannot rely on ‘big brothers’ such as the FRG or the EU. In addition, 
development objectives are usually not so clear-cut and well defined. Even if a 
developing country seeks to emulate the development trajectory of more advanced 
countries and seeks to copy their institutional frameworks, the question arises which 
country ought to be the role model. The institutional matrices of modern capitalist 
economies are far from being the same. This becomes obvious if one compares the 
economic as well as the social and political orders of the United States, the EU, and 
Japan, or the institutional settings within the EU, e.g., those of Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. All of these countries display a great variety of stabilizing, 
legitimizing, and regulatory institutions that guide economic exchange. This implies, 
as Rodrik (1999) correctly emphasizes, that the institutional foundation of a 
successful market economy cannot be uniquely determined. Hence, the existence of, 
and the need for, institutional diversity has to be accepted as well as the fact that 
even the most advanced economies are constantly under pressure to search for new 
institutional arrangements that are suitable to better overcome existing problems (i.e., 
at lower costs or with higher social benefits) and to meet practical challenges in the 
future (Unger 1998). 
Furthermore, the great variety of successful market economies indicates that the 
economic institutions of capitalism do not represent a ‘general purpose technology’ 
that promises to sustainably increase total factor productivity and to significantly shift 
the frontier of production possibilities outwards in any given country just by acquiring 
it off-the-shelf. The caveat against adopting institutions that have proved to be 
socially beneficial in other countries, especially if these are at a different stage of 
development, has been persuasively stressed by Rodrik (2007). Adherents to a more 
gradual approach to institution building emphasize that the efficacy of the economic 
institutions of a market economy is contingent on particular local problems, 
                                                 
10.  Regarding the economic, institutional, and political transformation of the former GDR, see, e.g., 
Sinn and Sinn (1993), Willgerodt (1994), Brücker (1995), and Mummert and Wohlgemuth (1998).   14
capacities, preferences, and needs.
11 Similar to technology policy, tacitness and 
circumstantial sensitivity in implementing and operating economic institutions such as 
social security programs, social partnerships, rules guiding the representation of 
minorities, currency boards, or labor market regulations make it difficult to rely on 
best-practice approaches. Imported institutions may fail to meet the specificity 
requirements of local needs, and institutional blueprints are usually incomplete 
because the knowledge that is necessary to use these institutions properly can often 
not be delivered but has to be acquired through local learning and experimenting. 
Although these are convincing points made by the adherents to gradualism, this 
mode of institution building is not without dangers either. A first caveat reminds us 
again of the importance of a secure political foundation underlying policy reform, 
namely that gradualism may come in different forms and shapes. For example, the 
gradual approach to economic transition in most successor states of the USSR is 
less a reflection of self-conscious and rule-based experimentation with the desire to 
build more efficient institutions, but an outcome of political instability, pork-barrel 
politics, rent seeking, and efforts to block market-oriented reforms. In contrast, the 
gradual approach to institution and capacity building in East Asian countries such as 
Taiwan, South Korea, as well as China and Vietnam during their recent history 
followed a more pragmatic approach that sought to enhance local knowledge and 
meet local needs.
12 A second caveat against gradualism stresses the costs of 
reinventing the wheel again and again. As Rodrik (1999) argues, gradualism may 
waste resources and time if policymakers do not take advantage of institutional 
arbitrage. In some particular (mostly technical or legal) areas, institutional 
arrangements can be adopted from more advanced countries. This holds, e.g., for 
the institutions underlying the operation of central banks, anti-trust agencies as well 
as financial regulations or auditing and accounting standards. 
Considering the preceding arguments, one may conclude that the successful 
acquisition of economic institutions which help establish an appropriate governance 
structure for a Social Market Economy depends, on the one hand, on a secure 
political foundation of policy reform that ensures credible commitments and the 
capacity to implement new institutions and, on the other hand, on the strategy of 
                                                 
11.  See, e.g., Qian (1999) as well as Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000) who argue that the institutional 
peculiarities of the development process in China are solutions to local informational and political 
problems for the solution of which no blueprint exists. 
12.  See Sections VI.2 and VI.3.1 in Ahrens (2002) for further elaboration on this point.   15
institution building. Important lessons can be learned by LDCs and PSCs from the 
experiences of more advanced economies. But a simple transplantation of institutions 
from one country to another is basically associated with severe problems. This 
makes gradualism the superior way of establishing and maintaining a local economic 
order, especially if policymakers are not dogmatic so that they use institutional 
arbitrage where it is appropriate. 
 
 
3.2  The paradox of the adjusting state
13 
 
In neoclassical models, the state is exogenous to the economic reform process. It is 
considered a black box which (usually unsuccessfully) seeks to solve problems 
arising in market processes. This perspective, however, is largely inappropriate for 
dealing with the paradox of the adjusting state which aggravates the practical 
problems of economic reform and transformation particularly in transition countries. 
This paradox concerns the ambivalent role of governments during the transition from 
a state-led model of economic development toward an open, market-oriented 
economy. While the state (i.e. the central government, sub-national authorities, the 
legislature, and the bureaucracy) is required to withdraw from policy interventions into 
economic processes and to perform a more passive role, economic transition and 
development usually require nimble and robust political authorities to be in place, 
ones capable of implementing and enforcing the new market-oriented policy 
directives. Performing this role is even more complicated if the executive branch of 
government needs to assume further (market-enhancing) tasks due to existing 
market imperfections. Making the state more effective so that it can meet new 
challenges and perform new roles in facilitating private-sector coordination is of 
utmost importance for feasible and successful economic transformation and policy 
reform strategies.
14 
In order to conduct effective policy or institutional reforms, governments need to 
assume roles for which they have typically lacked the capacity and capability. 
Establishing the institutions which constitute a stable market-oriented economic 
order, introducing policy instruments to indirectly steer market processes and to 
                                                 
13   The following discussion is taken from Ahrens (2007a and b). 
14  This central issue, however, was not explicitly included in either the Washington Consensus or 
neoclassical approaches to policy reform; see, e.g., Aoki et al. (1997) and Streeten (1996).   16
effectively provide public goods, crafting effective devices to enforce market laws and 
regulations and to collect tax revenues, building up a meritocratic independent 
economic bureaucracy, and generating a transparent system of information 
exchange between the public and the emerging private sector − all these tasks are to 
be assumed by state actors. The underlying institutions do not evolve automatically 
but need to be explicitly crafted and enforced by the government, whereas the 
government at the same time is required to reduce the scope of its activities, to 
overcome overstaffing, and to cope with budgetary bottlenecks. 
The paradox of the adjusting state precisely reflects this lack of institutional, 
administrative, technical, and political capacities. Regardless of whether a 
government decides to follow the policy recommendations of the Washington 
Consensus or whether it opts for a more activist role to overcome coordination 
failures and other market imperfections (which occur frequently in a transition 
process), a complex politico-institutional structure needs to be put in place in order to 
make government more effective in accomplishing whatever tasks it undertakes. 
Such institutionalization, however, cannot be taken for granted. 
Similarly, this argument also holds for economic transitions taking place within 
authoritarian settings such as in China, Vietnam, Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. Even if 
the problem of simultaneity, which has been a constituent characteristic of systemic 
transformation in most countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and much of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), has been largely absent in East 
Asian and some Central Asian transition settings, the existing non-democratic 
regimes can only make use of their presumably strong states and become effective 
ordering powers of economic restructuring if they succeed in adjusting and reforming 
their political, administrative, and economic institutions in a way that helps authorities 
to maintain legitimacy and credibility from the standpoint of ordinary people as well as 
domestic and foreign investors. Thus, even in these authoritarian countries, which 
may basically allow to effectively conduct bold necessary, though possibly unpopular 
reforms without facing immediate political resistance, appropriate rules need to be 
introduced, organizations built up, and technocratic, administrative, and political skills 
accumulated which help to craft a secure and stable politico-institutional foundation 
of far-reaching market-oriented reforms. 
 
   17
3.3 Best-practice  institutions? 
 
Due to the complexity of systemic transition, policymakers as well as academics are 
frequently tempted to identify best-practice approaches from successful reformers. 
This was true at the beginning of the 1990s when the so-called Washington 
Consensus (originally compiled for debt-ridden countries in Latin America in the 
1980s) was sought to be applied to many economies in transition. Several years 
later, new insights emerged due to the experiences in early transition phases. In fact, 
the Washington-Consensus type of policies emphasized important policy measures 
in an era of transition (such as stabilization and liberalization), but they neglected 
institution building (except for crafting private property rights). Particularly, the failure 
of IMF-led transition programs in countries such as Russia revealed that 
liberalization-cum-privatization approaches did not automatically bring about efficient 
and sustainable market structures. Without consideration of political and societal 
conditions as well as institutional restrictions, an efficient and politically feasible 
transition policy could not be implemented.
15 
This was taken into account during the subsequent debate about so-called 
second-generation reforms, when institutions were considered essential also from the 
viewpoint of analysts with a more neoclassical background. The next step was to 
identify best-practice institutions in order to make policy reform effective, market 
forces work, and eventually overcome government failure. An emerging consensus 
among scholars of economic development and transition as well as international 
organizations suggests that a distinct set of core institutions can be identified which 
spur economic growth and sustained development.
16 According to this view, key 
institutions, which should be crafted as quickly as possible, include, among others, 
the rule of law, private property rights, an independent judiciary enforcing private 
contracts impartially, thorough regulation to safeguard economic competition, sound 
corporate governance structures and a transparent financial architecture, undistorted 
                                                 
15   Of course, some scholars had already taken those difficulties in policy formulation and 
implementation into consideration in early stages of transition. Some scholars questioned the 
Washington Consensus approach per se, whereas others postulated an explicit evolutionary-
institutional transition concept which focused on microeconomic aspects such as asymmetric 
information and agency problems among others; see, e.g., Roland (2000) or Murrell (1995). This 
strand of analysis and policy advice, however, did not gain significant influence in the policymaking 
circles of CEE. 
16   Note in this context, that policy advisors as well as the international donor community may be also 
adaptive to new experiences and insights. The World Bank (2000), e.g., explicitly concedes that 
so-called best-practice models regarding governance and institution building may not be feasible.   18
markets characterized by low rents, social insurance, democratic accountability and 
participation rules, checks and balances, and strengthening civil society (Khan 2002, 
Bardhan 2005). 
Basically, these Western-style best-practice institutions may represent a useful 
reference point for less developed countries and transition economies. However, 
experts advising governments on institution building have often neglected the 
processes of how these institutions are crafted and enforced. Frequently, a country’s 
initial conditions are ignored and policy advice is driven by the presumed desirable 
goal of transition (i.e., Western-style best-practice institutions), and not by the search 
for a politically feasible path towards that goal (Qian 2003). In particular, it is hardly 
discussed that institution building needs to be driven by political actors in numerous 
cases and, hence, that is must be in the interest of these actors to craft those 
institutions. 
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The “liberal-market consensus” (Khan 2002) appears to suggest a benchmark for 
institution building which is to be achieved in a straightforward linear trajectory of 
institutional reform as quickly as possible (see Figure 2). However, the small number 
of highly-performing economies especially in Asia (but also in other parts of the 
world) followed a different path of development (and so did today’s industrialized 
countries at the early stages of their economic development and growth processes). 
They realized extraordinarily high levels of growth and sustained them over a 
considerable period of time without fulfilling the criteria of Western-style institution 
building.
17 
Therefore, yet another consensus began to emerge even more recently which 
goes beyond institutions. Since it is not single rules but the interplay of economic and 
political institutions being crucial for economic performance, scholars and 
practitioners came to agree that governance matters. And again, we observe a new 
quest − this time for best-practice governance structures. Against the background of 
the liberal-market consensus, which still dominates numerous policy circles, think 
tanks, and academia, a governance structure, which is argued to be a precondition to 
structural change and sustained economic growth, ought to be modelled according to 
a Western-style governance model. This view is frequently supported by the fact that 
                                                 
17   See, e.g., Khan (2002) and Chang (2002).   20
numerous people see a liberal democracy with particular social, economic, and 
environmental standards of advanced economies not only as an instrument fostering 
economic development, but as an end in itself.
18 
However, as history tells us, best-practice governance structures cannot be 
reasonably defined due to different initial conditions faced by transition countries, 
different economic structures and stages of economic development, different political 
interests and different societal preferences (Ahrens 2002a and 2007b). Instead, in 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as in China and Vietnam distinct 
governance structures have been emerging. In these successfully transforming 
countries, the emerging governance structures have proved to be market-enhancing 
and, hence, served as catalysts to economic transition. In all of these cases, country-
specific  market-enhancing governance structures (MEGS) contributed to positively 
affect the respective government’s credibility and improved the attraction of these 
countries as an investment and production location despite significantly different 
initial conditions and economic transformation strategies. Although these cases 
differed from one another, they fit into the analytical comparative concept of a MEGS 
(Ahrens 2002a). Even if none of the countries was able to bring about a perfect 
MEGS, governance-related institutions in all countries scored comparatively high 
according to the dimensions credibility, predictability, and transparency − 
‘comparatively’ relating to a comparison with other countries at a similar stage of 
economic development or in a similar phase of transition. Also, the relatively good 
performance in terms of institutional quality has not necessarily related to all pillars of 
a MEGS equally. But in sum, the emerging governance structures have been 
conceived to be growth-enhancing and sustainable over time from the viewpoint of 
foreign and domestic investors, and the respective governments proved to be able to 
credibly commit to honor investors’ rights and to foster long-term growth. 
What is remarkable about these positive developments in LDCs and PSCs is that 
especially the Asian economies in transition crafted effective institutions of economic 
and administrative governance which improved the quality of public policymaking, 
enhanced private sector development and market exchange, but did not undermine 
the power of incumbent governments. Contrary to most European transition 
countries, democratization played a minor if any role in this process − similar to the 
                                                 
18   See, e.g., the arguments in Khan (2002), Feng (2003), and Kaufman et al. (2003).   21
process of long-term development in countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, or Malaysia between the early 1960s and today. 
On the contrary, in the transition countries which acceeded the European Union 
in 2004 and 2007, the processes of strengthening governance and fostering 
democratizaion coincided. This can be attributed inter alia to historical factors, 
cultural values, but also to the fact that the EU as an external anchor to transition 
forced these transition economies to adopt the so-called acquis communautaire 
before they joined the Union. Thus, while this group of countries pursued a linear 
path of reform and transition as portrayed in Figure 2, the Asian countries (as well as 
today’s advanced countries such as Germany or Chile) chose a ‘roundabout way’ in 
order to realize high economic growth rates as well as social achievements such as 
lower poverty rates. Without engaging immediately in democratization steps, they 
built strong governments which could rely on effective administrative and economic 
governance structures. For these countries, this development trajectory proved to be 
sustainable. And as the example of Germany in the late 19
th century or the cases of 
Chile (since the mid 1970s), Germany (after World War II), South Korea and Taiwan 
(since the early 1960s) indicate, such a development path can (or will) eventually 
lead to more democratic structures in the course of time. 
Whether or not a country is better suited to follow the linear trajectory or the 
‘roundabout way’ as depicted in Figure 3, depends on that country’s economic 
starting position, its historical legacy, its internal power structure and the incentives 
faced by its leadership. For most of today’s transition countries under authoritarian 
rule including most Central Asian countries, but also China and Vietnam the linear 
development path is simply not feasible under its current leadership. 
 
 
3.4  Introducing a Social Market Economy in a non-democratic setting: the case of 
transitional institutions 
 
In order to make the economic transition succeed, market-enhancing governance 
structures (MEGS) need to be developed. Today, a common understanding holds 
that no blueprint exists regarding the design, the evolution, or the components of a 
MEGS, but that effective governance structures need to be adjusted to country-
specific characteristics (Rodrik 2007). However, numerous studies indicate that some   22
general guiding principles do exist: Besides the need for a strong but limited state 
and market-oriented capacity building in the public administration, key economic 
institutions should be crafted and enforced which ensure a proper functioning of 
market processes and private sector coordination.
19 
According to Rodrik (2007), these key economic institutions relate to rules for 
macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment, rules of the legal, regulatory, 
educational, financial, and social infrastructure as well as institutions for conflict 
management. Although these areas point into the same direction as Eucken’s 
constituent principles, they remain even more general and leave room for 
interpretation. In Rodrik’s (2007: 6) words: 
“first-order economic principles (…) do not map into unique policy packages. Reformers have 
substantial room for creatively packaging these principles into institutional designs that are 
sensitive to local opportunities and constraints.” 
In particular, the high-performing countries in East Asia have convincingly 
demonstrated that pragmatic (not first-best) institutions can foster sustained 
economic growth in a non-democratic setting. Exemples include the East Asian 
tigers, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonisia, and more recently 
Vietnam and China. These cases indicate that unorthodox transitional institutions 
may turn out to be more effective than presumably best-practice institutional 
arrangements in a period of economic transition. Especially for an authoritarian 
regime, they could make market-oriented reforms a viable policy choice, because 
they help political authorities to maintain power and control and, in addition, open up 
ways to make political elites winners of reform. Finally, specific transitional institutions 
tailored to the needs, capacities, and capabilities in the respective countries could be 
much faster developed than best-practice institutions − the latter usually need a long 
period of time to be crafted and enforced, and in many underdeveloped autocratic 
transition economies (e.g., in Uzbekistan, Tadschikistan or Turkmenistan), there 
would be a lack of human capital to operate them (e.g., law drafting and 
enforcement). Evidence shows that transitional institutions can serve as functional 
equivalents to first-best institutions, e.g., with respect to creating incentives for doing 
business, to introduce competition, or to establish control rights over the means of 
production (Qian 2003). 
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For example, special economic zones (SEZs) may represent a transitional 
institution regarding a gradual external opening-up strategy in the sense that a free-
trade area or a customs union with third countries would be more efficient from a 
theoretical viewpoint, but at a given point in time it may not be feasible. Therefore, 
SEZs could serve as a second-best way to open up the economy and, in addition, 
signal a government’s commitment to market-oriented reform. This would be 
reinforced, e.g., through public infrastructure investment, low tax rates, and liberal 
institutions and market rules governing the SEZs (Khan 2002). 
With respect to internal economic reforms, transitional institutions may, 
incrementally but visibly, enhance a government’s credibility. The starting point would 
be to create a strong state, i.e. to enable authorities to credibly pre-commit to market-
oriented reforms and to enforce new rules of the game. A key challenge is to shield 
policymaking entities such as the economic bureaucracy and key government 
agencies from the influence of reform opponents. Thus, public administration reform 
and capacity building are essential to strengthen the state apparatus. This requires (i) 
strengthening economic policy formulation, coordination, and implementation, e.g., 
through a central economic planning board − possibly staffed with foreign experts; (ii) 
public financial management reform; and (iii) civil service reform. In addition, 
meritocratic recruitment and promotion standards could provide bureaucrats with 
long-term career rewards thereby reducing incentives for corrupt behavior. 
In advanced democratic market economies, state strength is usually limited and 
political credibility enhanced through a subtle system of checks and balances. This 
option, however, is not available in autocratic transition countries. In such a case, one 
(far from perfect but) feasible option is to limit the government through an external 
flanking of the respective country’s reform and international integration process. 
Gradually opening up the economy and increasing its exposure to foreign 
competition as well as membership in international organizations might help to 
incrementally and credibly enhance reform commitment. In the longer run, the 
authoritarian, though possibly reform-minded government can seek to bind its own 
hands at least regarding specific policy realms (e.g., through establishing an 
independent central bank). 
Since measures such as performance-based employment policies, downsizing 
surplus staff, and organizational restructuring are central to improving the 
implementation capacities of weak executing agencies, it is necessary to complement   24
sector-level capacity building with measures that concern the public administration in 
its entirety.
20 Such an approach to public administration reform would not threaten 
the political regime per se. To be effective, however, institutional and organizational 
reforms usually have to be complemented by human resource development, the 
more so as knowledge of market economics and modern management techniques is 
often absent in LDCs and PSCs. 
Regarding economic reforms, macroeconomic stability is an unalterable 
precondition. This presupposes a market-oriented price system and a (possibly) 
independent central bank as well as prudent fiscal management and at least a 
rudimentary market-oriented tax system. However, in some country-specific contexts, 
a complete price liberalization would contradict the interests of the political 
leadership. The same may hold for large-scale privatization. In such cases, it may be 
more promising to legalize and foster already existing small-scale private 
transactions, e.g. on farmers markets, in the retail sector as well as in industry and in 
an emerging service sector. Promoting newly emerging small and medium sized 
enterprises and gradually creating a labor-intensive private sector in a bottom-up 
manner could reinforce a partial price liberalization, support supply-side reactions of 
the economy, and foster job creation. 
Chinese reform experiences show that agricultural reform by abolishing 
agricultural collectives and establishing a household responsibility system can yield 
substantial and quick productivity gains. This might increase confidence in market 
forces and strengthen the support of further reforms at later stages (Lee 1997). 
Regarding industrial restucturing, China adopted a dual-track approach which 
allowed to maintain parts of the planned economy for a transition period, until a 
possibly emerging private sector will have gained sufficient economic strength so that 
it can absorb surplus labor from heavy industry (Qian 2003). This approach helped to 
enhance economic efficiency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), to minimize 
opposition to economic reforms ex ante (due to temporarily protected status-quo 
rents) and to increase the opposition to reform reversal ex post (due to an increasing 
number of people benefiting from reforms) (Lau et al. 2000). In other countries, such 
an approach could make industrial reforms compatible with a prevailing, potentially 
market-skeptical political ideology. Furthermore, it would be consistent with a gradual 
strategy of opening up vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
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Last but not least, as long as no dominant capitalist sector exists in the economy, 
growth-enhancing reforms need to be in the interest of regime officials at the central 
and local level. Only if these actors can preserve their power and privileges and 
become reform winners, economic transition will be politically feasible. Again China 
offers an example of how to deal with such a challenge: Decentralized public 
commercialization through the devolution of economic competencies and the creation 
of township-and-village enterprises (TVEs) with hard budget constraints could help to 
re-align incentives of local policymakers and bureaucrats and make them residual 
claimants of market processes. Moreover, the experience of TVEs suggest that 
control rights may be established and can foster entrepreneurial activities even if 
property rights are not clearly defined (Qian and Weingast 1997). Thus formal 
legislation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for ensuring effective 
control. In practice, Rodrik (1999) concludes, the efficacy of control rights is 
contingent not only on legislation but also on private enforcement as well as informal 
norms such as customs and tradition. In order to avoid a capture of local 
governments by possibly emerging local groups owning immobile factors of 
production such as land, the introduction of a household responsibility system should 
be complemented by a possibly egalitarian distribution of land rights at the beginning 
of an economic reform process. 
Thus, through an economic empowerment of local governments (and possibly 
parts of the military or other powerholders in a particular country), developing local 
public enterprises can be crucial for an economic take-off process even before large-
scale privatization is undertaken. In addition, it would be conceivable to create 
competition under a dual-track approach; e.g., by fostering the emergence of private 
businesses in sectors such as agriculture, retail trade, and light manufacturing, and 
strengthening the corporate-control structures of, and introducing hard budget 
constraints for, TVEs and SOEs. At a later stage, industrial liberalization and 
privatization can proceed. Financial liberalization should be deliberately delayed in 
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4. Conclusion 
 
At first glance, it may seem that the concept of the Social Market Economy is 
applicable only in differentiated, democratic, advanced capitalist countries. The 
preceding discussions, however, showed that the idea of the Social Market Economy 
can be, and in fact has been, applied in an incentive-compatible way for 
policymakers, entrepreneurs, managers, workers, and citizens even in non-
democratic countries at lower stages of economic development. This can work if the 
transition process is not conceived as a quest for first-best, best-practice, or ideal 
institutions, but as a discovery process of institutional evolution during which diverse 
sets of institutions may emerge, fulfill various economizing or redistributive functions, 
and eventually vanish, because other, novel institutional arrangements appear to be 
superior. This phenomenon of transitional institutions has been hardly studied in 
academia, but theoretical reasoning as well as the existing evidence suggest that 
transitional institutions serving as functional equivalents to so-called first-best 
institutions may turn out to be not only efficient, but also politically feasible and widely 
accepted in society. The quest for these transitional institutions is not easy and 
cannot succeed from a private study in the ivory tower of academia. Instead, it is 
subject to trial-and-error procedures, experimentation, competition, but also political 
pragmatism. The task of policy advisors and policymakers is to craft an institutional 
framework which is appropriate to enhance what North (1990) called the adaptive 
efficiency of an economic system. 
  Eucken’s constituent and regulating principles provide guidance on the 
direction of institutional change and reform. But as was argued in this paper, the 
attributes, i.e., the concrete institutional design, of a Social Market Economy are 
contingent on the stage of socio-economic development, the cultural environment, 
political constraints, and what Eucken (1990/1952) called the historical moment. 
Singular events and favorable historical moments may serve as trigger or catalyst, 
but they cannot substitute for good institutions and determined political leadership. 
The existence of policymakers who seize those opportunities and seek to craft a 
politico-institutional foundation, which helps to make effective market-oriented 
reforms a viable policy choice, is an unalterable precondition to successful transition. 
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